INTRODUCTION
Collective bargaining is a cornerstone of industrial democracy. It gives employees a collective voice vis-à-vis the employers who always represent collective entities (that is, the companies). The quantitative importance of collective bargaining, as a means of regulating the employment terms, generally increases with its coverage, that is, the number of employees under its purview. Since employees account for the vast majority of the population, the terms of employment are of macroeconomic relevance and relate to broader developments of economy and society. Hence collective bargaining is not only a matter of industrial democracy, but also of socioeconomic governance.
This raises the question of whether and how collective bargaining actually aff ects the employment terms and other socio-economic conditions, as compared to a situation where collective bargaining is absent. This chapter addresses the question by analysing the economic eff ects of collective bargaining coverage on the basis of a cross-national comparison of 18 countries for the period from 1980 to 2000. The structure of this chapter is as follows:
• Section 9.2 summarizes the main lines of theoretical reasoning on collective bargaining and economic performance.
• Section 9.3 describes the hypotheses, the modelling strategy and measures for collective bargaining coverage and bargaining centralization. It gives an overview of the dependent variables, which include three major areas: economic effi ciency, (un)employment and the distribution of income.
• Section 9.4 presents the empirical results on the impact of collective bargaining on economic effi ciency, employment and wage inequality.
• The study concludes by summarizing its main fi ndings.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
As is the case with other subjects, the theoretical debate on the presumptive socio-economic eff ects of collective bargaining is controversial. One can distinguish between two lines of reasoning. The fi rst is driven by neoclassical economics, which not only dismisses the relevance of collective bargaining, but also any importance of (non)market institutions in general. According to neoclassical orthodoxy, institutions do not matter because perfect markets -through their informational feedbacks -ensure that effi cient solutions are achieved. While this line of reasoning and assumption regarding perfect markets allows researchers to construct elegant mathematical models, these do not match reality. This is most evident when one considers the role of power in determining outcomes. Perfect markets are, by defi nition, devoid of power insofar as all actors are forced to adapt their strategies to the market, that is, they have to take the market price without the possibility that they might exert infl uence and set prices. This is at odds with actual market conditions where power relations are always present. In fact power asymmetries between business and labour are endemic to labour markets (for example Off e and Wiesenthal, 1980) . Growing internationalization has magnifi ed this asymmetry: a case in point being the marked diff erence in the transnational mobility of capital and labour. Markets are not "natural" but socially constructed (Polanyi, 1944) . Hence, their structure is always skewed towards and embedded in a particular confi guration of power, interests, and socio-cultural norms.
The second line of reasoning draws from institutional economics, sociology, and political science. It is premised on the assumption that institutions in which specifi c confi gurations of power, interests, and norms have crystallized -do matter. Consequently, diff erences in the institutional set-up result in diff erent socio-economic outcomes. Applied to our problem, this means that diff erences in the extent to which working conditions are regulated through collective bargaining in a labour market (as indicated by collective bargaining coverage), as well as diff erences in the structure of collective bargaining (such as bargaining centralization), translate into diff erential socio-economic outcomes. 1 This section will give a very brief overview of the debate on collective bargaining and performance. Given the subject of this chapter, we concentrate on those dimensions of collective bargaining and performance for which quantitative, cross-nationally comparable time-series data are available. This implies that our focus will be on bargaining centralization (since the theoretical and empirical literature only addresses collective bargaining coverage as it relates to bargaining centralization) and on performance at the macro level.
As regards the socio-economic eff ects, we distinguish between the demand and the supply side. On the one hand, collective bargaining aff ects the demand side of the economy insofar as the standard rates fi xed by collective agreements secure the purchasing power of the employees and thus essentially condition consumer demand. In addition to the aggregate eff ect of collective bargaining on purchasing power, the literature also commonly emphasizes the distributive eff ect. The argument is that pay structures become more egalitarian with growing levels of bargaining coverage and bargaining centralization. On the other hand, collective bargaining is also important to the supply side. In this respect, the literature mainly highlights the fact that collective bargaining has an impact on labour costs and thus infl uences the competitiveness of the companies. However, there are other important supply-side eff ects as well. This includes skill formation as a factor of growth, employment and competitiveness. As is well known, the supply of skilled labour is beset with collective-action problems and the risk of market failure. As a collective approach to labour market regulation that involves the two sides of industries, collective bargaining can make a substantial improvement to vocational training and further training (see chapter 3 in this volume).
There are tensions between the demand-side and supply-side requirements of economic policy. As a consequence, collective bargaining also faces a trade-off between demand-side and supply-side considerations. Ideally, collective bargaining balances these considerations such that its agreements stimulate consumer demand for the sake of employment and economic growth while also moderating pay demands in line with the requirements for price stability and competitiveness. This does not simply mean pay restraint as this would reduce the role of collective bargaining to supply-side considerations of pay. On the contrary, collective bargaining institutions have the capacity to synchronize policies and strategies with economic requirements so that both demand-side and supply-side considerations are taken into account. 2 We call this pay synchronization. Put in more economic terms, this capacity depends on the ability of the bargaining system to internalize the negative consequences of its policy. Diff erences in this capacity are assumed to correlate with diff erences in the bargaining structure, for example, the degree of bargaining centralization.
Theoretical reasoning on the socio-economic eff ects of collective bargaining concentrates on two issues: (i) the distributional impact in terms of relative pay; and (ii) the impact on aggregate pay, along with its macroeconomic consequences for infl ation and employment.
As far as relative pay is concerned, the theoretical and empirical literature widely agrees that pay diff erentials become compressed with growing levels of bargaining centralization and collective bargaining coverage. This eff ect is argued to be driven by economic, ideological and political mechanisms (Wallerstein, 1999) . The economic argument refers to efficiency gains from a pay levelling eff ect. The argument is that decentralized forms of pay-setting result in a misallocation of labour and a misalignment of prices because decentralized pay setting distorts the market process as a consequence of marked diff erences in union strength, presence of collective agreements, productive processes and elasticity of demand for output across companies and sectors. In these circumstances, central-level bargaining, which imposes equal pay for equal work, brings about a wage distribution that may come closer to the model of a perfectly competitive labour market than decentralized modes of wage formation (Moene and Wallerstein, 1997) . Ideologically, the positive impact of bargaining centralization results from the fact that considerations of fairness -which are always important to pay policy -become increasingly generalized with growing levels of bargaining decentralization. The larger the number of employees who are covered by one single, central-level agreement, the more egalitarian the eff ect of applications of equal sharing rules. The political mechanism rests on the condition that the majority of employees earn less than the mean. Therefore, the median voter, that is, the employee whose vote gives the union leadership the majority, supports a policy of wage compression (Freeman, 1980) . While this situation applies to any union and any level of bargaining, the scale of its pay-levelling eff ect throughout the economy increases with growing bargaining centralization.
From a theoretical point of view, three issues deserve mention. First, with growing levels of bargaining centralization, the confederation and their member associations, rather than the individual employees, determine the distributional strategies of the union. The pay distribution of the members of the associations and their confederation may not necessarily mirror the overall pay distribution in the economy (Traxler and Brandl, 2010) . Second, conventional concepts of bargaining centralization overlook the fact that central-level bargaining is usually one single component of a multi-level bargaining system that also embraces the industry and/or the company as the locus/loci of bargaining. Third, the ideological and political explanations for the pay levelling eff ect of centralization focus only on labour while neglecting the role of the employers in pay determination (Dell'Arringa and Pagani, 2007) .
Turning from the eff ect on relative pay to the eff ect on aggregate pay and its macroeconomic consequences, one fi nds three main lines of arguments: The corporatist thesis assumes a linear relationship between bargaining centralization and the capacity for pay synchronization (for example Cameron, 1984; Headey, 1970) . Accordingly, this capacity monotonically increases with the degree of centralization because growing degrees of centralization prevent the bargainers from passing the negative pay externalities (that is, the costs of pay rises in terms of infl ation, unemployment and loss of competitiveness) on to third parties (for example consumers, other employee groups and the state) (Figure 9 .1). In the case of full centralization, as given under the condition of one single, all-encompassing collective agreement, the signatory unions and employer associations are compelled to internalize the negative pay externalities of their agreement because it is their own members who have to bear its costs. Hence, they will be anxious to synchronize their pay policy to minimize negative pay externalities.
The corporatist thesis has been challenged by the hump-shape thesis (Calmfors and Driffi ll, 1988) . In contrast to the corporatist thesis, the hump-shape thesis emphasizes the importance of market eff ects. Assuming perfect competition in product markets, Calmfors and Driffi ll (1988) develop a non-linear (hump shape) thesis (Figure 9 .2) that predicts that extremes (highly centralized and highly decentralized bargaining) perform well, while the performance of intermediate centralization (that is, industry-level bargaining) is poor. Fully centralized bargaining is presumed to perform well for the reason outlined above. The comparatively good performance of decentralized (that is, single-employer) bargaining is assigned to (perfect) competition in product markets which preclude the companies from passing their pay hikes on to their product prices. By contrast, industry-level bargaining is presumed to be able to externalize the costs of its pay increases on to the public since it works like a branchspecifi c cartel. Hence, industry-level bargaining is assumed to be able to ignore macroeconomic requirements such that its performance is inferior to centralized and decentralized bargaining. Recent research questions both the corporatist thesis and the humpshape thesis as they abstract from important factors that intervene in the performance of collective bargaining. There are three kinds of such shortcomings. First, both theses only attribute pay synchronization to centralized bargaining structures. This over-simplifi cation ignores the fact that coordination of industry-level bargaining across the economy can work as a functional equivalent to centralized bargaining (Soskice, 1990) . Analogous to centralized bargaining, none of the industry-level bargaining units can externalize the costs of pay rises if their pay policies are coordinated across the economy. Second, the assumption of perfect competition does not match the reality of markets. Third, the hump-shape thesis is deduced from a model of a closed economy in which the parties to industry-level bargaining face a demand curve which is relatively inelastic. In open economies, actors in industry-level bargaining are not able to form cartels. At an aggregate level, the performance of industry-level bargaining in open economies is conditional on how bargaining for the exposed sectors relates to its counterpart in the sheltered sectors. If the exposed sectors set the pattern for the overall bargaining process, then industry-level bargaining tends to outperform alternative bargaining structures (Traxler and Brandl, 2010) .
The consequence is that analysis has to account for the broader economic and institutional context in which collective bargaining is embedded. In accordance with this, analytical and empirical studies have produced results that show that the economic performance of collective bargaining is highly contingent on its interaction with its context. Research in this tradition considers the interaction of collective bargaining with factors such as monetary policy (for example Franzese, 2002; Iversen, 1998; Traxler et al., 2001) ; government partisanship (for example Alvarez et al., 1991; Lange and Garrett, 1985) ; the sectoral composition of the labour force (for example Crouch, 1990; Garrett and Way, 1995 Traxler and Brandl, 2010) ; and the capacity of the bargaining system to make local pay setting comply with their agreements (for example Traxler and Kittel, 2000; Traxler, 2003) . This is not the place to review this literature, it is merely to point out that it is now commonly accepted that the performance of collective bargaining varies depending on the circumstances. Therefore, one and the same system of collective bargaining may bring about fairly distinct economic outcomes. This implies that while there are functionally equivalent bargaining systems, there are diff erent pathways for good economic performance.
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COVERAGE

Conceptual and Methodological Considerations
Our short overview of the theoretical debate shows that its focus is on the impact of bargaining on pay. It is clear that this focus does not capture the full range of socio-economic eff ects of collective bargaining. Therefore, the rationale of this study is to analyse available data with the greatest possible number of socio-economic performance indicators. Our key explanatory variable, collective bargaining coverage, designates one specifi c dimension of collective bargaining. As the ratio of employees who are covered by any collective agreement to the total number of employees, collective bargaining coverage indicates the quantitative importance of collective bargaining as compared to alternative modes of employment regulation (that is, individual labour contracts and unilateral regulation by the state).
From a demand-side perspective, collective bargaining coverage is likely to matter insofar as the purchasing power of the employees tends to increase with its coverage. The supply-side eff ect of bargaining coverage is controversial. One infl uential stream of the debate assigns a detrimental eff ect to growing rates of collective bargaining coverage. It argues that pay fl exibility decreases with growing coverage and particularly that the alleged wage-levelling eff ect of high coverage causes unemployment.
As the previous section shows, theoretical reasoning on the economic eff ects of collective bargaining focuses on centralized bargaining and not collective bargaining coverage. However it is diffi cult to disentangle these two dimensions. Collective bargaining coverage signifi cantly increases with bargaining centralization (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2008; Traxler and Kittel, 2000) . According to the data available to this study, high coverage does not coincide with strongly decentralized bargaining. 4 Centralization is widely presumed to also generate a wage-levelling eff ect (for example Aidt and Tzannatos, 2008) . Hence, there are two closely interrelated dimensions of collective bargaining that are both held to reduce wage diff erentials, but nevertheless appear to have contrasting eff ects on unemployment.
Similar considerations apply to the interaction of coverage and coordination (pay synchronization). 5 Higher bargaining coverage is also correlated with measures of coordination (Traxler and Kittel, 2000; Aidt and Tzannatos, 2008) . It is also plausible that the effi cacy of coordination activities depends on the coverage rate.
These considerations cast do ubt on whether there is an empirically robust relationship between collective bargaining coverage per se and performance. It appears that the interaction with other dimensions of collective bargaining, such as centralization, is important when considering the relationship between collective bargaining and performance.
This leads us to the following hypotheses and modelling strategy. Proceeding from those areas of socio-economic eff ects for which comparable data are available, we hypothesize that growing levels of coverage signifi cantly compress the pay structure, boost labour cost growth and infl ation, and increase unemployment. However with growing levels of centralization, the hypothesized eff ects on labour costs and unemployment are supposed to decline. The null hypothesis (that is, the assumption that bargaining coverage does not have a systematic eff ect) is as important as all other hypotheses.
In respect of the modelling strategy, although we have time-series data on coverage for 18 countries, the number of cases is nevertheless rather limited. This restrains the number of explanatory variables which can enter the models. While focusing on bargaining coverage, we also pay special attention to union density and bargaining centralization. Put more specifi cally, we include an interactive term to capture the interplay of coverage and centralization. This is because most of the literature emphasizes the pre-eminent importance of bargaining centralization in general and its contingent eff ect on the impact of the coverage rate. However, we also run models which do not include this interactive term. We also include a limited number of control variables which vary with the respective 
Collective Bargaining Coverage and Bargaining Centralization: Measures and Trends
Comparable time-series data on collective bargaining coverage are available for 18 OECD countries: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA. Our study covers the time period from 1980 to 2000. This is because data before 1980 are available only for a few countries (Nickell et al., 2001) . The data from 1980 to 1995/1996 are from Traxler et al. (2001) while the data for the rest of the period covered are our own calculations. The defi nition and calculation of collective bargaining coverage follows Traxler (1994 Traxler ( , 1996 and Traxler et al. (2001) . For detailed information on the defi nition and sources see Table 9 .1. Since collective bargaining coverage captures as the ratio of employees covered to the total number of employees, it is important to comment on both its numerator and its denominator. The numerator refers to the number of employees under any type of collective agreement. This specifi cation is important because systems of multi-level bargaining exist in many countries such that one single employee may be covered by more than one collective agreement. One has to avoid double counting in these cases because this would bias the cross-national comparison. Hence, the numerator measures "net coverage" of employees, regardless of how many agreements an employee is covered by.
In respect of the denominator here a distinction needs to be made between the unadjusted and the adjusted coverage rate. The unadjusted coverage rate (ucbc) is defi ned as the share of employees under a collective agreement in relation to the total number of employees, regardless of whether or not they are entitled to conclude collective agreements. The adjusted coverage rate (acbc) refers to the share of employees covered by collective agreements in relation to the total number of employees equipped with bargaining rights. For example, the public sector or certain parts of it (for example essential services) may be excluded from the right to bargain. In these instances, the terms and conditions of employment may be unilaterally determined by the state. However in practice, de facto negotiations often do take place between the authorities and the unions. Of the 18 countries, some exclusions are found in Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Great Britain, and Japan. In France, Traxler (1994 Traxler ( , 1996 and Traxler et al. (2001) . The concept of statutory regulation of the working conditions in the public sector was improved according to Traxler (1999) . If there is a formal right of public-sector employees to conduct collective bargaining, countries are classifi ed as having collective bargaining in the public sector even when these agreements require unilateral approval by government or parliament. For a detailed description see Traxler et al. (2001, pp. 306-7) . Data source: Traxler et al. (2001) New Zealand) 9 = combination of industry and company/plant, both all groups 9.5 = combination of industry and company/plant, both all groups and group-specifi c equally important (UK 1970-83) 10 = combination of industry and company/plant, group-specifi c 11 = company/plant, all groups 11.5 = company/plant, all groups and group-specifi c equally important 12 = company/plant, group-specifi c Source: Traxler et al. (2001) 1985; Belgium 1980 and 1995; Germany 1980; Netherlands 1980 , New Zealand 1980 Portugal 1980 and 1995; Spain 1980 Spain , 1985 Spain and 1990 Switzerland 1980 and 1995 Spain and the Netherlands, the right to bargain was given to publicsector employees during the period under consideration, that is, in 1984 , 1988 , and 1993 , respectively (Traxler et al., 2001 ). On the other hand, notable groups of public sector employees were excluded from collective bargaining in Great Britain during the early 1980s and early 1990s. From a methodological point of view, the adjusted coverage rate measures the signifi cance of collective agreements as compared to individual contracts only for those sectors where it is relevant. The unadjusted rate represents the relevance of collective bargaining in relation to alternative regulatory mechanisms in a country's labour market, that is, individual contracting and unilateral regulation by the state. A detailed summary of developments is given in Table 9 .2, which documents the changes in the level of unadjusted coverage for each of the 18 countries. Two important observations can be made. First, the level of coverage varies enormously across countries. These coverage rates range from less than 30% (Japan and the USA) to 90% and more (for example Belgium and Sweden). Second, there is a high degree of continuity, characterized by either stability at a given level or a persistent trend towards continued growth or decay. As a result, the coverage rates across countries do not converge over time. Instead, there is growing polarization between countries with high and low rates of coverage. Traxler et al. (2001) analyse the determinants of these patterns and fi nd the following: (i) Multi-employer bargaining structures cover a high proportion of employees, especially when complemented by consistently applied statutory mechanisms to extend the coverage of collective agreements to employers who are not affi liated to the signatory employer associations. 6 In most of these cases, more than two thirds of the employees are covered by collective agreements. In these countries, collective bargaining coverage is either stable at a high level, or growing. This characterizes the majority of the European countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain).
(ii) Where statutory extension provisions are lacking or rarely implemented, the coverage rate increases monotonically with union density. In other words, where extension procedures lack statutory support, the incidence of collective bargaining becomes a matter of union strength. This leads to very diff erent outcomes. On the one hand, there is a cluster of countries with low levels of both coverage and unionization that includes the USA and Japan. On the other hand, there is a cluster of Scandinavian countries with high degrees of both unionization and coverage. Germany and Switzerland hold less accentuated, intermediate positions. (iii) Single-employer bargaining covers a small proportion of employees.
In countries where this is the norm, less than one third of the employees are covered by collective agreements. This is mainly because single-employer bargaining presupposes a strong union presence in the company which is only the case in large companies. However, large companies only account for a minority of the total number of employees. In 2000, the USA, Japan, Canada, New Zealand and Great Britain belonged to this group. In the EU-15, for instance, employment in large companies, defi ned as employing 250 employees or more, accounts for around only 30% of total employment (Traxler, 2007) . (iv) Single-employer bargaining and multi-employer bargaining together with extension practices unleash contrasting forces in respect of collective bargaining coverage. Single-employer bargaining fuels inter-fi rm competition which in turn creates a strong incentive for employers to pursue anti-union policies or dismantle collective agreements. There are no comparative incentives in multi-employer bargaining. Moreover, extension practices which build on multiemployer bargaining set an incentive for employers to join their employer association, which buttresses collective bargaining and increases its coverage.
These fi ndings explain cross-national diff erences in the coverage rate and account for the observed changes over time. The coverage rate (Grainger and Crowther, 2007) . In Germany, multi-employer bargaining, which was never supported by consistently implemented extension practices, declined from the mid-1990s onwards. Combined with the economic problems and competition unleashed after unifi cation, this fostered a noticeable decrease in coverage. As data on West Germany from the IAB panel reveal, coverage fell from 70% in 2000 to 67% in 2005.
With the exception of Great Britain and Germany, collective bargaining has remained stable at comparatively high levels throughout Western Europe. This is remarkable because European economic integration exposed collective bargaining in these countries to the disruptive forces of intensifi ed international competition. At the same time, fi xed exchange rates and the EMU deprived these countries of the means of cushioning these competitive pressures through exchange rate and monetary policy. This shows that statutory support of extension mechanisms can help buttress collective bargaining against international competition and moderate downward pressures on labour standards.
As can also be seen from Table 9 .2, we do not have data on the 18 countries for each of the years under consideration. However, the high continuity of country developments enables us to fi ll the data gaps by extrapolation.
8 Figure 9 .3 shows the development of the adjusted and unadjusted collective bargaining coverage from 1980 to 2000. The columns indicate the average levels of coverage over the 18 countries. The dotted lines represent the standard deviation (that is, the scale of diff erences in the coverage rates across the 18 countries). Regarding the level of coverage, by defi nition, the adjusted collective bargaining coverage is higher than the unadjusted rate. Aside from this, the two indicators tend to run parallel over time and exhibit similar trends. Collective bargaining coverage (both adjusted and unadjusted) fell slightly over the entire period. The diff erence in the levels between countries modestly grew until the mid-1980s, remained rather stable until 1989, sharply increased from 1990 to 1995, and again modestly widened afterwards. From a long-term perspective, the trend is one of growing polarization across countries as the level of coverage increasingly diverges. At the one end are countries with multi-employer bargaining and consistent extension practices, and at the other, countries characterized by single-employer bargaining. The observed diff erences in collective bargaining coverage across countries are not caused by mere coincidence, but originate in structural properties of the national bargaining systems and the degree of statutory support. As outlined above, the economic eff ects of collective bargaining coverage are commonly assumed to be conditional on the degree of bargaining centralization. The concept of bargaining centralization refers to the level at which a collective agreement is formally concluded. Bargaining centralization increases encompassment, that is, the comprehensiveness of the agreement as demarcated by its formal purview. Encompassment has two dimensions (Moene et al., 1993) . The vertical dimension captures the level of economic activities covered by an agreement. The main levels are local (the plant and the company), intermediate (the branch, sector and occupation) and central (cross-sectoral agreements). The horizontal dimension refers to whether bargaining for distinct categories of jobs (for example blue-and white-collar workers) is conducted separately or jointly. Bargaining systems characterized by the same vertical level may diff er in their horizontal encompassment. For instance, bargaining took place at a cross-sectoral level over a long period of time in both Ireland and Finland. However, in Finland there were separate accords for blue-and whitecollar workers, whereas in Ireland, joint agreements were struck for these employee groups. Measures of bargaining centralization thus require a composite index of both dimensions. It is appropriate to take vertical centralization as the basic criterion for such an index since diff erences in vertical encompassment have a larger impact on the purview of an agreement than an agreement's horizontal encompassment. Therefore, for example, the overall degree of bargaining centralization is ranked higher for Ireland than for Finland. Many OECD countries are characterized by multi-level bargaining. This further complicates attempts to measure the degree of bargaining centralization. In order to do so, one has to clarify the relative importance of the distinct levels in multi-level bargaining systems. The problem is that the relative importance of distinct levels may vary depending on the particular issue and sector. We focus on the centralization of wage bargaining since wages are the key issue of bargaining in any country and on the primary level at which this is negotiated in the private sector. Even within this specifi ed framework, it is diffi cult to assess the relative importance of the distinct bargaining systems. For instance, an industry-level agreement covers more employees than the limited number of complementary company agreements within its purview. However, the latter usually fi x employment terms which are more favourable to their employees than the more encompassing industry-level agreement. For reasons of logical consistency we rely on encompassment in these cases.
Following this rationale, we adopt a corresponding measure of bargaining centralization (cebale) (Traxler et al., 2001) , which an assessment of alternative centralization measures classifi ed as one of the two best available measures (Kenworthy, 2001 ).
The Dependent Variables
This study aims to cover as many socio-economic eff ects of collective bargaining coverage as possible. This implies a rather long list of dependent variables. By and large, one can diff erentiate between three main areas of socio-economic eff ects. Each of them is considered by specifi c measures. Generally, the selection of measures is constrained by the availability of data. They stem from offi cial statistics and their defi nitions follow the conventions underlying these statistics. For details of their defi nition and data sources, see Table 9 .1. The three areas of possible socio-economic eff ects and their corresponding measures are as follows:
(i) Economic effi ciency is captured by the growth rates of nominal labour costs (Δcpe), unit labour costs (Δulc), real labour costs (Δrlc), labour productivity (Δpdty), infl ation (infl ), and the growth of real domestic product (Δgdp). (ii) (Un)Employment is measured by the aggregate unemployment rate (ue), the unemployment rates for males (uemale) and females (uefemale). (iii) Finally, the income distribution (d9d1) is measured by the ratio of gross earnings (income from employment) at the 90th percentile to earnings at the 10th percentile.
It is important to note that due to the lack of comparable data, this list of variables does not cover other relevant eff ects such as the level of pay, health and safety and so on.
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COVERAGE
The following sections present and discuss the empirical fi ndings. The regression models are set up as time-series cross-section models covering 18 countries for the time period 1980 to 2000. For systematic reasons, these statistical analyses are done for both the adjusted and unadjusted coverage rate. However, we do not expect the two coverage measures to diff er very much in their eff ects. This is because the development of the adjusted coverage rate runs parallel to that of the unadjusted coverage rate as shown above.
Economic Effi ciency
Economic effi ciency, which includes the employment terms in our study, is at the heart of any study on the eff ects of collective bargaining for two reasons. In particular, the employment terms determine the living conditions of the employees. On the other hand, they are the causal link between collective bargaining and macroeconomic performance. Collective bargaining may have an impact on labour cost, which in turn may aff ect macroeconomic aggregates such as infl ation, unemployment and growth. If there is no statistically signifi cant impact of bargaining on labour costs, any empirical fi nding showing a signifi cant eff ect on macroeconomic performance is dubious. The key employment terms are pay and working time. Unfortunately, comparable data on standard pay rates, which are most directly determined by collective bargaining, are not available for all countries covered by this study. We use nominal labour costs (that is, compensation per employee, cpe) as a proxy for pay. Nominal labour costs also embody other nonwage labour costs such as social security contributions. Nevertheless, they are a reasonable approximation since the growth rates of pay and nominal labour costs are highly correlated (Traxler et al., 2001 ). In addition to nominal labour costs, we study the impact of collective bargaining on the growth of unit labour costs (Δulc), real labour costs (Δrlc) and labour productivity (Δpdty). Additionally, we investigate the impact of collective bargaining on two "classical" aggregates of economic effi ciency, that is, infl ation (infl ) and economic growth (Δgdp).
The results of the regressions are shown in Table 9 .3a and b. Beginning with the models which do not include the interaction with centralization (Table 9 .3a), coverage does not signifi cantly impact productivity or any measure of labour costs. The same applies to our models which also estimate the eff ect of the interaction of coverage with bargaining centralization (Table 9 .3b). Since bargaining coverage has no signifi cant impact on labour costs, it is unlikely to aff ect infl ation (infl ). The results from this regression analysis confi rm these reservations: neither the unadjusted coverage rate nor the adjusted rate show a signifi cant eff ect on infl ation and economic growth. The same applies to the models which interact the coverage rates with bargaining centralization.
(Un)employment
Since there is no evidence of a robust impact of coverage on labour costs, there is little reason to expect that coverage strongly aff ects our measures of unemployment. This is confi rmed by our results (Table 9 .4a and b). There is one exception: overall unemployment (ue) increases with unadjusted coverage when the interaction with centralization is excluded. However, the corresponding results for adjusted coverage remain insignifi cant. The same holds true for the models that include the interactive terms. In none of these models does either coverage or the interaction of 
Income Distribution
Comparable data on income distribution are sparse. Continuous timeseries data are not available. Hence, we conduct a pooled analysis as measured by the ratio of gross earnings at the 90th percentile to earnings at the 10th percentile (d9d1) for select years. Most of the empirical studies of the impact of bargaining on pay diff erentials fi nd that centralization and the degree of bargaining coverage have an equalizing eff ect on income distribution (for example Rowthorn, 1992; Rueda and Pontusson, 1997; Wallerstein, 1999; Zweimüller and Barth, 1994) . Our empirical fi ndings are summarized in Table 9 .5. Collective bargaining coverage per se is insignifi cant. However, the model specifi cation with unadjusted coverage has a signifi cant pay levelling eff ect according to the model which includes the interactive term (centralization). Given the body of evidence on the relationship between collective bargaining and more equitable earnings distribution (see chapter 6), we wonder why the impact of collective bargaining coverage on equality is not as strong as we expected. It is plausible that the pay-levelling eff ect of bargaining coverage has declined over time (Baccaro and Ferguson, 2008) . One important reason for this possible development was the tendency to redesign the regulatory tasks of higher and lower levels bargaining since the mid-1980s, which fi rst aff ected working time and then pay from the early 1990s onwards. Centralized bargaining systems have undergone a process of organized decentralization in which multi-employer settlements have delegated important bargaining tasks to the local level (Traxler et al., 2001) . Regarding pay bargaining, this process has been most pronounced in the Scandinavian countries, which are commonly held as most centralized (Stokke, 2008; Traxler et al., 2008) . Similar processes of organized decentralization have also taken place in countries where industry-level bargaining traditionally prevails, like Austria, Germany and Italy.
Unfortunately, data characteristics do not allow for an empirical examination of whether and how the pay-compressing eff ect of bargaining centralization and bargaining coverage has changed during the time period under consideration.
Franz Traxler and Bernd Brandl -9781849809832 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/25/2019 01:00:03AM via free access 9.5 CONCLUSIONS According to conventional wisdom, high degrees of collective bargaining coverage reduce pay fl exibility and inhibit macroeconomic performance. This is commonly presumed to be ameliorated by growing degrees of bargaining centralization. Our empirical fi ndings question this reasoning. They reveal that collective bargaining coverage exerts neither a positive nor a negative infl uence on most socioeconomic variables. However, when the level of collective bargaining is included in the analysis, we fi nd that greater centralization, together with a higher degree of (unadjusted) collective bargaining coverage has a positive and signifi cant eff ect on earnings inequality and reduces any potential eff ect on overall unemployment. This brings us to the question of why our fi ndings contrast with conventional wisdom. There is both a methodological and a theoretical answer to this question. Methodologically, empirical studies may come up with diverging results as a consequence of diff erences in design, data and measures, and time periods. Most of the earlier studies, particularly those covering longer time periods, use rather rough rankings of bargaining coverage. It is worth noting that one of the strengths of this study lies in combining a time-series cross-section statistical design with more precise measures of collective bargaining coverage for a time period that covers the most recent comparable data.
Theoretically, the socio-economic eff ects of collective bargaining coverage remain unexplored. Collective bargaining coverage is presumed to constitute a performance-inhibiting rigidity. This echoes the neo-liberal verdict on the detrimental eff ect of any collective regulation of the labour market (for example Siebert, 1997) . This view is widely refl ected in public and political debates. However, it is at odds with the literature on the comparative performance of distinct bargaining systems. The fi ndings of this literature show that relatively centralized bargaining systems and coordinated bargaining systems fare well under certain circumstances. The same could be said of relatively high levels of coverage since it correlates with centralization and coordination of bargaining.
Our fi ndings are consistent with the fact that a certain level of coverage can combine with other bargaining properties which are commonly seen as important determinants of performance (for example coordination and centralization). For instance, we observe that relatively high levels of coverage are associated with both intermediate and high bargaining centralization (that is, multi-employer bargaining in general). However, as previously noted, there is evidence that the performance of centralization and coordination depend on particular circumstances. Therefore, we agree with Aidt and Tzannatos (2008) that future research should explore interaction between these diff erent dimensions.
The fi nding that collective bargaining coverage has a negligible eff ect on social and economic conditions (with the exception of earnings inequality) is unspectacular. Nevertheless, it is important since collective bargaining coverage captures the degree of industrial democracy more than other dimensions of bargaining. Seen from this perspective, one can conclude that collective bargaining does not confl ict with economic effi ciency, while an erosion of coverage caused by deregulation or a weakening of the collective bargaining system will not improve economic performance and may well contribute to growing earnings inequality, social disruption and confl ict. 
